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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for divorce under R.S. 9:301 one of the parties must have lived
continuously separate and apart for at least two years in Louisi-
ana before jurisdiction to hear the proceeding will vest in a
court of this state.
The jurisdictional requirement of domicile and the venue
requirement for separation and divorce are mandatory and un-
equivocal ;18 only the conditions of locale with which the grounds
must comply may be otherwise provided for in the statute au-
thorizing such grounds. 1 Thus, grounds prescribed by any law
which does not itself "otherwise provide" must comply with the
general conditions of locale of Article 10 (7). This interpreta-
tion prevents divorce-minded spouses in other states from taking
advantage of what would be an otherwise liberal jurisdiction
provision, and abrogates the need for further amendment to
R.S. 9:301 to require expressly that the ground for divorce
created thereby occur in Louisiana. In summary, a party de-
siring a divorce or separation in Louisiana must: (1) have
grounds prescribed by a general divorce or separation statute
that either satisfy the conditions for existence of jurisdiction
found in Article 10 (7), or conform to other conditions expressly
prescribed in the statute establishing the grounds; (2) be either
a Louisiana domiciliary or bring suit against one; and (3)
institute suit in the proper forum provided by Article 3941 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
David S. Bell
CRIMINAL LAW -THE LOUISIANA OBSCENITY STATUTE
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
Respectable authorities agree serious dangers lurk in the
apparent widespread dissemination of obscene and pornographic
materials throughout the United States.' Obscenity statutes exist
18. Constitutionally and jurisprudentially, see note 8 supra, and accompanying
text; statutorily, see note 1 supra, and accompanying text; as to venue, see note 7
supra.
19. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 10(7) (1960). See note 7 supra.
1. An increased sex-crime rate among juveniles in the United States which
parallels the increased exposure to American produced pornography has been cited
as a primary danger. Moreover, communist subversion has also been blamed for
the attempted demoralization of youth through dissemination of such materials.
Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of ALI and ABA, The Problems
of Drafting an Obscenity Statute, No. 9, 67, 68 (1961), and authorities cited
therein.
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in most jurisdictions in an effort to suppress these dangers.2
Following in their wake are serious constitutional problems of
freedom of speech and press. This Comment will examine these
problems in connection with the test for constitutionality of
obscenity legislation. Louisiana's obscenity statute will be
evaluated in light of federal jurisprudence with a view to pos-
sible redrafting of the clause defining obscene and pornographic
material.3
The first amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech and press.4 The framers of this amendment
apparently intended an assurance of free interchange of ideas
which would advance the cause of truth, justice, and liberty.
Inevitably, the delicate question arose whether this freedom of
speech and press was absolute; the answer was in the negative. 5
The specific issue whether obscenity was utterance within the
ambit of protected speech and press was eventually presented
to the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States.6
2. People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 578, 590, 175 N.E. 2d
681, 688 (1961): "The common judgment that obscenity should be restrained is
also reflected in the international Agreement for the Suppression of the Circula-
tion of Obscene Publications entered into by more than fifty countries .. . , in
the obscenity laws of our forty-eight states . . . . and in the scope of obscenity
laws enacted by Congress since 1842." (Dissenting opinion by Froessel, J.)
3. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 388, § 1,
La. Acts 1960, No. 199, § 1, provides: "A. Obscenity is the intentional: . . .
(2) Production, sale, exhibition, gift, or advertisement with the intent to primarily
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, or of any lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or sexually indecent written composition, printed composition, book, maga-
zine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper, writing, phonograph record, picture, draw-
ing, motion picture film, figure, image, wire or tape recording or any written,
printed, or recorded matter of sexually indecent character which may or may not
require mechanical or other means to be transmitted into auditory visual or sen-
sory representations of such sexually indecent character."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. 1; see Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684 (1959).
5. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1919) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1924).
A recent New York case involving the circulation of magazines illustrates
the principle that freedom of speech and press is not absolute. People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 578, 175 N.E. 2d 681 (1961), held a statute which
prohibited the publishing and selling of materials "incontestably found to be
obscene" did not offend first amendment guarantees. Id. at 581, 175 N.E. 2d at
682. The court cited Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), which
had held valid a New York statute under which booksellers could be enjoined from
selling obscene books as regulating obscenity without prior restraint.
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth was charged by indictment in New York with
the mailing of circulars and advertisements which were allegedly obscene and in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948). Alberts v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) was considered by the Supreme Court with Roth. Alberts, conducting a
mail order business in Los Angeles, was charged with possession for sale of
obscene books in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311 (1955).
In Roth, the court noted that, although on numerous occasions it had indi-
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The Court squarely held that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected free speech or press."'7
To be contrasted with obscenity cases are those involving
an advocacy of ideas not in themselves obscene albeit unconven-
tional. The United States Supreme Court has held unconstitu-
tional a state statute prohibiting the showing of a motion picture
portraying sexual immorality "as desirable, acceptable, or proper
patterns of behavior."8 In so holding the Court emphasized the
distinction between obscenity and unconventional ideas immoral
by current standards - promulgation of the latter is protected
by the first amendment.9
A dilemma is faced by legislators endeavoring to formulate
a statute regulating moral conduct, i.e., construction of a test
specific enough to inform one of the prohibited crime, yet not
so restrictive as to encroach upon freedom of speech and press.,0
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roth lends
guidance in travelling this narrow path. Roth rejected defend-
ant's contention that material was not obscene unless it pre-
sented a "clear and present danger" of inciting antisocial be-
havior." Instead the Court formulated as the constitutional test
for obscenity the following: "Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest."'12
cated an assumption that freedom of speech and press did not include obscenity,
this was the first case in which the issue was squarely presented. id. at 481.
7. 354 U.S. at 483. Reviewing constitutional history from 1712 to 1792, the
Court noted thiat not every utterance was protected by the first amendment. The
Court concluded: "[A]t the time of the adoption of the First Amendment,
obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently
contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection
intended for free speech and press."
8. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
9. The Court stated that censorship of the motion picture Lady Chatterly'$
Lover, not for obscenity, but for alluring portrayal of adultery as proper behavior
"struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty." Id. at 688.
10. See Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126 A. 2d
310 (1956) ; see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957
Term -Criminal Law and Procedure, 18 LA. L. REV. 119, 120 (1957).
11. The Court quoted Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) : "[L]ibel-
lous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it
is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts to consider the issues behind
the phrase 'clear and present danger'." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486
(1957). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
12. 354 U.S. at 487. Going further, the Court quoted the test adopted by
later decisions of American courts: "[W]hether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id. at 489, See MANual Enterprises
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), 16 VAND. L. REV. 257.
"Prurient interest" is defined by MODEL PENAL CODE §207.10(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957) as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,"
going substantially "beyond customary limits of candor in description or represen-
tation of such matters."
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The Court indicated that a statute is not void for vagueness
if the wording is such that one would understand what conduct
is proscribed, for neither precision nor impossible standards are
required. Consequently, statutes employing the terms "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . or indecent character," and "ob-
scene or indecent," were found to "give adequate warning of the
conduct proscribed" when applied according to the test for
obscenity outlined by the Court.13
An obscenity statute which does not require the element of
scienter - a term signifying defendant's guilty knowledge 1 4 -
imposes strict criminal liability for mere performance of the
prohibited acts. The United States Supreme Court has held
freedom of speech and press are too severely restricted by
elimination of the scienter requirement; therefore, to be con-
stitutional, an obscenity statute must contain that element, 5
even though other criminal statutes have been found adequate
without the scienter element. 16
Section 2 of Louisiana's present obscenity statute17 has never
been constitutionally challenged. However, an analysis of it in
terms of the Roth test should shed light on the probable outcome
of such a challenge.
The statute characterizes as obscene material that is "lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or sexually indecent" or "of sexually indecent
character."'' Rothb approved, as constitutionally adequate speci-
fications of the crime charged, statutes employing the words
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy... or indecent character" to
describe the prohibited material. 9 Because of the obvious
similarity of wording,20 it seems reasonable to conclude that
13. 354 U.S. at 491. Applying the stated test, the Court said: "These words,
applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, already discussed,
give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and mark '. . . boundaries
sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law .. .'." Id.
at 491.
14. People v. Gould, 23 Mich. 156, 211 N.W. 346 (1926) ; Horton v. Tyree,
104 W. Va. 238, 139 S.E. 737 (1927).
15. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
16. "There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the dis-
tributors of foods the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing
a similar requirement on the bookseller." Id. at 152.
17. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 388, § 1;
and La. Acts 1960, No. 199, § 1, quoted note 3 supra.
18. Ibid.
19. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
20. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text. The Louisiana statute does
not employ the word "obscene" in characterizing the material. However, this
should make no difference since the words used by the Louisiana statute are
1963]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Louisiana statute is not void for vagueness or uncertainty
in the description of the proscribed materials.
The test in Roth- appealing to prurient interest- is ap-
plied to the statutory description of obscene materials, while the
Louisiana statute utilizes the test only in defining defendant's
intent ;21 defendant must have the specific intent to primarily
appeal to the prurient interest. Although the variance in the
subject of the test might raise doubt as to its adequacy, it could
be argued the test is indirectly applied to the material itself by
way of proof of the defendant's intent.
This variance of the subject of the obscenity tests leads to
another difficulty; on its face the Louisiana statute's require-
ment that there be a primary appeal to the prurient interest
may seem to satisfy Roth's requirement that the material be
considered as a whole to determine its dominant theme.22 How-
ever, since this primary appeal refers to the intent of the de-
fendant, not to the materials, it could be argued the dominant
theme of the materials is ignored. It is equally arguable, how-
ever, that the word "character '23 as used in the Louisiana stat-
ute when referring to the materials, means quality or trait of
the materials that can be judged only by a review of the entire
work.
In State v. Roufa2 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court held the
constitutional requirement of scienteri 5 was fulfilled by the Lou-
isiana statute.26
The Louisiana obscenity statute, as it now stands, may meet
the present constitutional tests as developed by the federal
courts.2 7 However, a redrafting may be helpful in order more
nearly to track the test of federal constitutional jurisprudence,
thus removing the problems previously discussed. This could be
synonymous with "obscene." See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (4th ed. 1951).
21. One must produce the sexually indecent materials with a specific intent
to appeal primarily to the prurient interest of the average person. Thus, evi-
dence must be submitted which establishes that the actor actively desired the
criminal consequences to follow.
22. See note 13 supra.
23. See note 18 8upra, and accompanying text.
24. 241 La. 474, 486, 129 So. 2d 743, 747 (1961) : "It leaps to the mind that
knowledge is necessary to intention and that one cannot have intention without
knowledge."
25. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
26. See notes 18-20 supra, and accompanying text.
27. Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 264, 267 (1960) states: "[I]t may be concluded
that the United States Supreme Court has fully adopted the 'dominant appeal to
prurient interest' standard of obscenity, and that it stands as the current federal
test."
[Vol. XXIII
1963] NOTES
accomplished by incorporation of the principles of the Model
Penal Code concerning obscenity statutes2 8 with those of the
Roth case.
A revision 29 of the Louisiana obscenity statute might read as
follows:
R.S. 14:106 Obscenity
A. Obscenity is the intentional:
(2) Production, sale, exhibition, gift, advertisement, ex-
change, or the possession with the intent to sell, exhibit, give,
advertise, or exchange, any lewd, obscene, or sexually in-
decent material,30 the dominant theme of which, considered
as a whole, applying contemporary community standards of
the average person, appeals primarily to the prurient inter-
est. Prurient interest, as used in this sub-section, means a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
going substantially beyond the customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters.3 '
Anthony J. Graphia
SALES- REFUSAL OF PURCHASER TO ACCEPT TITLE SUGGESTIVE
OF SERIOUS LITIGATION
Plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement to
purchase immovable property. Defendant school board contended
28. See note 13 supra.
29. The present statute possibly violates principles of good draftsmanship
because of its verbosity; but considering the nature of the conduct intended to
be precluded, the many variations of obscene matter, and the difficulties that
have arisen in construing obscenity (see generally Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 264
(1960)), conciseness and brevity must be sacrificed for the cause of enforcement.
See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1960 Term - Criminal Law
and Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 66, 68 (1960).
30. It is submitted that as an alternative, keeping in mind the difficulties
encountered in enforcement, the materials may be specified as in the present
statute. See note 3 supra. See also The Vork of the Louisiana Legislature for
the 1960 Term -Criminal Law and Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 66, 68 (1960).
31. In People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y. 2d 578, 175 N.E. 2d 681
(1961) the court was split 4-3 in favor of setting the constitutional limits at
"hard-core" pornography, despite the minority view that Roth v. United States
did not require such restriction, but merely set forth the minimum test of con-
stitutionality and outlined its limits. There is no Louisiana jurisprudence dealing
with this problem. Therefore, an adoption of the proposed redrafting will still
result in speculation where the Louisiana Supreme Court will draw its limits.
In Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 398 n. 26 (1963), however, it is suggested that MANual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), 18 VAND. L. REV. 251 so limits the Roth test.
